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SCIENCE AND ANIMALS - OR, WHY CYRIL WON'T WIN THE
NOVEL PRIZE
Lynda Birke

In loving memory of Tess, a wilful and feisty cairn
terrier, who was killed on the road the week before I began to
write, and of Ginny, a loving lurcher whose sudden death shortly
after deprived the world of beauty.

Prologue
There have always been animals in my life. I have long had a love affair
with horses; dogs, too, feature strongly in my emotions and in my house.
And not only companion animals, but also the wild creatures that
surround us all. Even in London, in the postwar devastation I witnessed
while growing up, I learned the joy of watching the birds in the trees.
In what sometimes seems another life, I trained as a scientist.
Ambivalent though I was about doing biology (surely I could not bear
the thought of cutting up dead animals?), I ended up studying just that.
For years, I agonized over the fate of animals in the laboratories, and my
own role as a student of biology in that fate. Here, I want to tell
something of my own story - how I survived doing science, but how my
relationships with animals finally persuaded me that science was too
disrespectful.
If now I can speak of these things, it is partly because I no longer work
in the laboratories. Courage to speak is always easier for those on the
outside. But it is also partly born of my feminism, which has
encouraged me to ask questions that are troubling - even about the
science that I was doing. Silence helps no one.
Becoming a scientist
Becoming a scientist - like any other professional training - is a gradual
process of learning: students must learn not only facts, but also how
scientists behave. Much of this is gained informally, at coffee and
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conferences. Gradually, you learn how to look at the world through
scientists' eyes, how to ask "scientific" questions, and what counts as
scientific knowledge and what does not.
Submerged in all this learning are two critical distinctions. One is that
knowledge only 'counts' if it is gained through scientific method; thus,
the knowledge of people who live or work with animals does not count.
The second is that there are (at least) two kinds of animals. Scientists,
like anyone else, might have very personalized relationships with
companion animals at home. Yet, in the laboratory, the 'lab animal'
becomes a tool of the trade, a sensitive piece of apparatus.
In telling my own story now I realize that I had to live with these two
contradictions. I acknowledged both ways of knowing, and I accepted
two quite different ways of being with animals. Yet despite these
overwhelming dilemmas, there were also good reasons to learn science.
One is that I was fascinated by it, by natural history and especially by
animals.The budding eight-year-old, pony-mad scientist learned to recite
the Latin names of every single bone in the vertebrate skeleton provided it had an equine form around it. Moreover, no one in my family
thought that girls could not do science; on the contrary, I was given
chemistry sets and learned to build radios.
I had moreover long been drawn to natural history; surely I thought,
science would enable me to study animals and plants in detail. Yet I was
ambivalent about doing biology precisely because of the need to do
things to animals. Twice over in my early training, I tried to concentrate
on the physical sciences: but always something drew me back to biology.
The fascination with the living world won out, even though I had to steel
myself against the need to do dissections - or worse. I often wonder,
when I hear people express concern about the need for people to
understand more science, how many have been put off it for life by
having to cut into animal flesh.
Thirty years later, I can still feel vividly that sense of horror at school as
I was confronted with a white rabbit with pink ears, for dissection. I said
nothing: you were simply expected to get on with it. Even by age 17, I
had been socialized not to show emotion; I did after all, want to do
science. Alongside the sense of revulsion however was another emotion,
a sense of fascination at the beauty of (once) living tissues, at how they
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are put together. For all that I think dissection is unnecessary in
biological education, it seems important to say that seeing 'what the
animal was made of' did have an impact.
So while I hated the very idea of picking out the frog that was to be
killed (which I handed to a friend to kill, rather than bear doing it
myself), there was a profound sense of awe as we stood together gazing
at the iridescent skin, the slowly moving red blood cells, through the
microscope. I cannot ever justify that animal's death; but I do know that
the awe stayed with me, making me feel even more strongly just how
beautiful animals are.
Yet whatever one's aesthetic reaction, scientific training soon makes the
student learn to suppress emotions. Slowly, you need to learn not to
show questioning reactions to the use of animals, living or dead. Insofar
as aesthetic or emotional reactions are encouraged in scientific training,
these are likely to be responses to what nature has become after the
processes of science. Scientists might for instance, express pleasure or
even excitement at the colours or the orderliness of cells in a photograph
taken with an electron microscope, just as I felt a kind of fascinated
pleasure at the colours and textures of the tissues from the animal I had
to dissect. But expressing anxiety about the sufferings of living animals
in laboratories comes suspiciously close to the rhetoric of animal rights
and would only be discouraged.
Budding scientists must learn to deny such feelings of empathy. Indeed,
those feelings are considered 'unmanly' as the entomologist Miriam
Rothschild once noted in a lecture. Whatever else it involves, becoming
a scientist entails learning to acquire, or fit into, the macho culture of the
laboratory and forswearing such 'feminine' responses as empathy with
the animals. In that sense, the suppression of empathy or other emotions
in scientific training is a gendered experience.
With all these contradictions and dilemmas in the background, I began a
research career with some unease. Somehow I ended up doing animal
behaviour research which at least allowed me to study what animals do
and is perhaps less disrespectful than many other areas of biology.
Despite all my turbulent feelings about animals and nature however I had
been sufficiently desensitized to toe the line:
ambivalence
notwithstanding, I did laboratory-based research - for a while.
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Yet alongside that I was also involved in both the Women's Movement
and in environmental activism. Out of those politics, I questioned more
and more what science was all about: what kinds of issues, for instance,
influence how science is done. To begin with I continued with research
justifying it to myself as long as nothing too nasty was done to the
animals and they were well cared for. Much of my research was
motivated by feminist questions - issues to do with women and health for
example - for which at that time I was prepared to swallow my
conscience and use animals as 'models' for humans. Only later did I
explicitly question the use of animals altogether, and the fact that
keeping them in laboratories must inevitably mean their exploitation and
subsequent deaths.
It seems to me that it is an abuse of animals, not respect, (let alone the
economic considerations) that allows large numbers of animals to be
bred only to be wasted. Animals are killed routinely in laboratories.
Some are 'sacrificed' in the course of an experiment; many more are
killed simply because no one uses them on time or because scientists
from one laboratory in the building don't particularly talk to those in
another. The result is that in different laboratories, animals are killed for
different parts of their bodies, when laboratories could co-operate and
thus save lives. I find it odd that the numbers of animals killed because
they are not 'needed' for experiments seems to merit far less attention
from animal rights activists than the animals killed during particular
experimental procedures.
Where individuals in the laboratory start to be respected as individuals
by humans is where they pass over the boundaries from the world of
'data' to becoming a pet. Researchers working with animals sometimes
designate particular animals as pets, so removing them from the realms
of potential experimental animals. Naming the individual is one way of
doing this; it is much harder to do something nasty to a Rita than to a
numbered rat.
I can well recall the occasional animal that passed through our hands that
would become special 'like a pet' - whose death we would mourn in a
way that we did not mourn for all of the other animals, who remained
numbers in cages. Cyril, for example, was a white rat whose front teeth
did not meet properly in the middle. Rather than 'cull' him (lab-speak for
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killing), we removed him from the experimental cages and kept him as a
pet, clipping his teeth into shape regularly so that he could eat.
Still, those concerns about killing did not for a long while actually stop
me from doing science. I knew that animals were going to have to be
killed. I knew that some of the procedures I might have to use were
somewhat invasive. Yet I swallowed my feelings about those for many
years - such is the power of the desensitization that comes through
scientific training.
Ironically, I was a vegetarian all this time. Eating animals was to me
unethical, even unthinkable, and I did not want to be part of it. Yet there
are many parallels between the meat industry and the breeding and
maintenance of animals in laboratories. Large numbers are bred in order
to be killed in both cases, and wastage is considerable. In both
industries, too, animals must be killed (sacrificed?) deliberately: an
animal that ups and dies on its own cannot count either as data or as a
meal.
Meanwhile, in the lab I dissociated myself. To be a scientist in the lab
meant having two, quite different, relationships to animals. My
experience of those animals with whom I lived and played was so much
at odds with my experience of animals in the laboratory. In lab work, you
end up treating animals in groups. Animal 39/2/F is just a number in a
cage. She represents a group or a treatment or a species, but you know
nothing about her own history, about her life with her companions.
For all that I was fascinated by science (and still am), doing it has meant
for me a sense of alienation, sometimes as a woman in a (still) largely
male world, and more often as someone who cares deeply about
animals. Cyril was lucky; his difference allowed him to become special.
Most of the many millions of animals that pass through the world's
laboratories each day are not.
It is distressing to be in a lab around people who are being cavalier with
animals. There is a disrespect in the way some people handle the animals
they use - not many people, perhaps, but enough. The animals often seem
to be tools, means to an end (and certainly become so when reduced to
numbers in the scientific report). Perhaps people don't mean to be cruel but stunning a rat by swinging it round by the tail while cracking jokes is
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hardly a sign of respect. On the other hand, I don't know that anyone who
wants to stun a rat would be able to behave in any other way. Is it
possible to have respect for the animal you are about to stun and
decapitate? Cracking jokes may be a way of coping with doing
something that, in other contexts, would be considered quite horrible. It
is, if you like, a way of giving the act a different name.
Naming nature: making scientific stories
Science is, ostensibly, about discovering how the world works; it is
meant to be the pursuit of truth and proof. Maybe so, but it is also - as
many critics have pointed out - deeply imbued with the values of the
wider society. So its twin tasks of naming and describing nature are not
innocent. How animals are described in scientific texts and natural
history programmes on television have considerable impact on how we
collectively
think about them.
That process helps to ensure that we continue to see non-human animals
as inferior to humans. Indeed, it is only quite recently that there has been
much scientific interest at all in the question of 'animal minds' or animal
consciousness. In my training, we were strongly discouraged from the
sin of 'anthropomorphism' - attributing human feelings to animals. What
that means is that you can talk at home about how much Rover
understands, but woe betide you if you even think about what Cyril is
feeling in the lab. The result, inevitably, is that scientists learn doublespeak. Perhaps we might get away with jokey references to animal
feeling or thought in the experiments: but then you must go away and
write that arcane language of scientific articles that denies any feelings at
all.
There are perhaps unsurprisingly many attempts to refute any evidence
that shows animals to be clever.There is too much invested, both
scientifically and culturally, in the notion of animal irrationality and
inability. Culturally, we in the West have come to want to separate
ourselves from nature, to shore up the boundaries between clever
humans and those furry, feathered and finned 'others' who are not human.
The more easily that they become 'others' the more easily we can treat
them with disrespect - whether they are other humans or other species.
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That is why many scientists can accept working with rats and mice, but
would find it difficult to work with primates: they are too like us. I am
also reminded of an anecdote about a scientist who felt that it was easier
for him to use greyhounds than other dogs, because they did not 'look at
you in the same way'. I shuddered when I heard that story, and thought of
my beautiful lurchers (relatives of greyhounds); Ginny was not 'other',
but part of my life and I of hers.
Even if scientists begin to study animal minds, there remains the problem
of how to interpret research findings. Humans are rather too good at
disparaging what an animal does, especially if it fails to perform a task in
the way that we would do it, and on our terms. Many books recount the
tale of the horse 'Clever Hans', who allegedly could count. When it
turned out that Hans was responding to his owner's unconscious cues, his
abilities were discounted. But to me that is still pretty clever; I would not
use the story to dismiss his abilities, merely because he did not seem to
'count' the way we do. I doubt that I could spot those subliminal cues to
which Hans responded.
Those who train animals might well wonder why it has taken science so
long to catch up with what they have long known about animal thinking.
They might sometimes adopt the languages of science - talking
behaviouristically of conditioning, for example - while simultaneously
believing in the animal's abilities to form complex concepts. Admittedly,
the kinds of animals that we train in depth are nearly always mammals or
birds; hence, we know relatively little about the concept formation of
other kinds of animals.
There is a strong belief that animals are simply not as smart as we are.
Yet interpreting 'stupidity' is not easy, even among ourselves. In looking
at 'animal consciousness', Radner and Radner note the case of a species
of bee that was fooled by experimenters into repeating a particular
behaviour pattern over and over again1 (the bees respond to the odour of
oleic acid, indicating to them that there is a dead bee in the hive that
should be removed. The experimenters daubed oleic acid onto a live bee,
and found that the bees repeatedly tried to remove it). Now, the
behaviour can be thought of as illustrative of bee stupidity. But why are
we so sure that they are simply being stupid?
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We ourselves cannot always recognize death, the Radners note, even
with the aid of high-tech medical apparatus. And we make allowances
for humans to be credulous or gullible even when they persist in
irrational beliefs, while 'animals...are expected to be perfect little
scientists. In order to earn the epithet "conscious" they must be proficient
in logic, ever ready to change their beliefs in the face of available
evidence, careful to take all considerations into account. When people
fail to live up to this idea, we say they are all too human. When animals
fail, they are said to be machine-like'.
There is an issue moreover about the conditions in which the animals are
tested by humans, as well as those in which they live. The animals used
in such tests are usually kept in relatively impoverished conditions, and
given tests that may not be particularly appropriate for their species. Yet
scientists can still conclude lesser intelligence! Even humans would
come out pretty stupid if given tests of their ability to find their way by
smell, or if they had spent their life living in a space the size of a small
bathroom.
Shoring up the intellectual boundaries between us and other animals
seems to be something of a cultural preoccupation, a protection against
great anxiety. In a preface to a short story, Ursula Le Guin reflects on
this, noting that
Some linguists deny the capacity of apes to talk in quite the
same spirit in which their intellectual forbears denied the
capacity of women to think. If these great men are
threatened by Koko the gorilla speaking a little [sign
language], how would they feel reading a lab report written
by a rat?2
How indeed.
Living socially: humans and other animals
Perhaps it does not matter that science makes these claims that animals
are qualitatively different from us. Yet the very same science also
expects to work on the assumption that non-human animals are
sufficiently similar to us that we can justifiably use them as 'models' for
us in experiments. Surely there is a contradiction here?
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Part of the reason why scientists can live with this contradiction is
precisely the reliance on data from groups or species (unless, ironically,
it is intelligence itself which is studied: then individuals may well be the
focus of attention). But when animals come in numbered lots (like rats in
stacked cages) it is much easier to ignore their idiosyncrasies. It is also
easier to ignore their status as sentient animals and to behave as though
they are merely tools of the laboratory. I well remember the technicians
in one laboratory I visited telling me that they had to swap the rats from
clear plastic cages to opaque ones. The reason, they said, was that the
scientists were disturbed 'because the rats would come and look at you'.
Looking with interest at the humans outside is something a sentient
animal might do: test tubes do not.
By contrast to the numbered lots of rats in the lab, I knew all the animals
at home, my horses or dogs, as individuals; I worked with them and
knew their idiosyncrasies. I trained the horses daily and began to
understand their individuality. Scientific accounts based on such
individual stories would be considered insufficient for any
generalizations about the species, horse. Yet after many years of working
with horses, I have a strong suspicion that I know that species far, far
better (and thus in a way that is more predictive of its behaviour) than I
know any of the species that I worked with in the laboratory. Yet isn't
science supposed to be about its ability to make predictions about the
natural world?
What I have learned from companions at home is how intelligent they
are, what love they have to give, how beautiful their movements are and
about their different personalities. I learn too how patient they are in
trying to get us to understand what they have to say - and how often we
fail. Science could never teach these things.
Still the laboratory work had its own value in the development of my
own thinking about our relationship to animals and what that means. It
was through working with rats, for example, that I came to appreciate
better what fine animals they are. I know full well the cultural loathing of
these animals which is played on by organisations defending animal use
in science as they point to the fact that most experiments are done on rats
and mice. Thus the British Research Defence Society points out to the
public that some 85 per cent of experiments are done on these creatures as though that somehow makes them more acceptable. People who have
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not had such relatively privileged lives as I have had may of course have
good reason to hate or fear them. Rats there are aplenty in the stables but
I have none infesting my house, and I cannot imagine what it must be
like to have them nibble my toes in my sleep. Cultural antipathy to rats
certainly has some grounding in the history of disease: yet it is also
loaded with myth, just as stories about the 'fearsomeness' of wolves
abound. As I watched them and worked with them so I grew to like
them, those little white rats with pink eyes (like Cyril) or the black and
white ones with sparkling dark eyes. I learned to appreciate their
curiosity and watchfulness, their playfulness, and their obvious
intelligence in spite of their impoverished lives in laboratory cages.
Every day that I entered the lab, I spoke to the rats - 'Hi, everyone!'. I
enjoyed their company. And every day my unease grew. To begin with, I
simply changed procedures, so that the animals were interfered with as
little as possible. But then one day I walked in and lifted the little wiremesh trap door of a cage as it sat on the floor. In the cage were a group
of young sisters, black and white adolescent rats. Curious, they all came
to the gap in their ceiling, putting their tiny paws onto the edge of the
wire, their bright black eyes sparkling and their whiskers whisking. I
looked at their paws, like miniature hands, at their glossy coats in
different patterns, and I marvelled at their inquisitiveness. I knew then
that I had had enough.
Ironically, I think that the work I do now has more to do with science, in
the sense that it is deeply motivated by my love of the natural world and
of animals. I continue to think, teach and write about 'how we think
about animals'. I did that as a working scientist, too: but now, I am
willing to range more widely, not to restrict myself. In that venture, I am
reminded of what philosopher Sandra Harding has said of science - that,
despite its pretences at objectivity, it cannot be strongly objective unless
it takes proper account of the 'missing voices'. For her, that includes all
kinds of human 'others' marginalized from science.3 For me, that must
also include non-humans.
Living with animals has made me sensitive to the complex ways in
which they and we become integrated into a social relationship.
Domestic horses, for instance, are not just 'broken', as the saying goes.
Rather, they are usually assimilated into relationships with us (and us
with them) from the day they are born. So too are domestic dogs. Yet
science has almost nothing to say about the emergence of relationships
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between humans and non-humans, or about the ways in which particular
kinds of animal enter human society. To be sure, we can read about the
'instincts of the dog' derived from its wolf ancestors, and about how
these predispose dogs to behave socially in certain ways. But where are
the studies of how dogs become socialized into human ways? Or even us
into theirs?
I have often wondered what science might look like if, instead of having
animals in numbered lots, they were treated respectfully as individuals.
Now my work includes thinking about what science might have become,
had its history been different, had it not relied on distancing ourselves
from nature. What stories would scientists tell if they spent their days
with Cyril instead of cages 34- 40? How would their tales change if they
had watched Tess, or Ginny, instead of watching machines printing out
data from beagles? They could no longer pretend to be distancing
themselves from nature; rather, they would have to listen. They might
even find that Cyril, or Ginny and Tess, had rather a lot to say, about life,
the universe, and even humans.
But can we listen?
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